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Standard cost variances are commonly used to highlight operational strengths
and problems , and their presence may be an indicator of fraud .

CECILY RAIBORN , JANET B . BUTLER, AND LUCIAN ZELAZNY

11 organizations, regardless of size or activity, are
vulnerable to fraud. However, manufacturing firms
seem to be particularly
vulnerable; a 2010 global survey of companies operating in more than 20 industries found that the manufacturing
industry had 10.7 percent ofal! reported
fraud cases, making it the second highest on the list. 1 Equally serious is the
financial impact of these frau d cases.
Manufacturers reported a median cost of
$300,000 per reported incident, an
amount nearly 90 percent higher than
the median for all companies surveyed.
Despite the fact that organizations
institute a wide variety of internal controls to deter and detect fraudulent activities, approximately 40 percent of fraud

is initially detected through tips from
stakeholders such as employees, customers, and vendors .2 Unfortunately, the
likelihood that a stakeholder will report
fraud is reduced by factors such as personal job security concerns and/or
whether management is involved in the
fraudulent scheme . 3 Given t hat manufacturing has been significantly impacted
by layoffs and economic downturns,
internal tipsters may be less likely to
come forwa rd because of concerns about
conti nued employment. Most manufacturers , though, have an important reporting tool that can help them detect fraud
without the u s e of w histleblower tips:
the standard cost variance . Standard cost
variances are commonly used to highlight
operational strengths and problems , but
the se reporting mechani sms can also
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serve as useful "red flag" indicators to help
manufac t urers identify fraud.
This article focuses on how standard
cost variances can be used in detecting
potential fraudulent activities . Each primary type of variance (material, labor,
and overhead) is addressed with a discussion of possible inappropriate causal
factors . Additionally, internal controls,
graphic techniques, and other methods
that can be implemented to combat fraud
are provided .

An internal control (IC) is any organizational process used "to provide rea sonable assurance regarding the
achievement of objectives in the following categories:
reliability of financial reporting;
effectiveness and efficiency of operations; and
compliance with applicable laws and
regulations"4
The three basic classifications of ICs
are preventive, detective, and corrective.
A preventive control is focused on precluding either the occurrence of a specific error or irregularity or the
nonoccurrence of a specific control objective. In contrast, a detective control identifies errors, irregularities, or unachieved
control objectives after an undesired
event occurs; the inappropriate actions
may have either eluded, or were not the
focus of, the preventive controls. In other
words, detective controls draw attention
to - but do not correct - a problem. A
corrective control is designed to help a
firm recover from undesirable or unauthori zed activities.
F.inancial and operational planning
requires estimates about future pric es
and usage of inputs. Standards specify
expected costs and/or quantities for manufacturing a single unit of product or
performing a single service. Managers
commonly use standards to estimate
future quantity requirements to help
determine purchasing needs for material, staffing needs for labor, overhead
capacity, and company cash flows. Standards also express the expected price to

be paid for material, rate to be paid to labor
personnel, and amount to be incurred
relative to variable and fixed overhead.
An important benefit of standard costs
is having norms against which actual
operating activities can be compared, so
that managers are able to assess operational effectiveness and efficiency. A well designed variance analysis system will
compute variances as early as possible
so managers can moni tor operations,
detect deviations from the norm, ascertain variance causes, and take any necessary corrective actions. As with all
business processes, the variance system
is subject to cost-benefit constraints .
Because undue investigations are expensive and inefficienV sup ervisors often
employ the management - by-exception
principle to distinguish between situations that can be ignored and t hose that
need attention . To implement management
by exception, upper and lower tolerance
limits of acceptable deviations from the
standard are established. If a variance is
outside of the tolerance limit, the variance should be investigated and its cause
ascertained. Variance ca u sality can be
determined through observation, inspection, and inquiry. Management should
then take action to eliminate unfavorable variances (or, on occasion, to continue favorable variances into the future).
Although managerial action is generally not required if variances are within
an acceptable range, upper management
should be aware of ongoing trends in
variances. A consistent, albeit small, variance might indicate the beginning of a major
problem . Additionally, variances are often
interrelated and, therefore , cannot be
analyzed in isolation from one another.
For example, poor quality material may
result in a favorable material price variance and an offsetting unfavorable labor
efficiency variance. Minimizing total unit
cost does not necessarily mean, given
desired output quality standards, that the
cost of each p ~oduct or service input
component should - or can - be minimized. Some possible input resource
combinations are not necessarily practicalor efficient. For instance, using lowtech equipment to minimize overhead
depreciation charges may not be rea-
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sonable in the manufacturing of hightech products.

Variance analysis and internal control

,
IMPLEMENTATION
OF A STANDARD
COSTING SYSTEM
INDICATES THAT
MANAGEMENT
RECOGNIZES THE
IMPORTANCE OF
HAVING
BENCHMARKS
AGAINST WHICH
TO MEASURE
ACTUAL
OUTCOMES.
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The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(COSO) 6 stated that an effective internal control structure has five components:
the control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information
and communicat ion, and monitoring.
Each component can be viewed with
regard to a standard costing system or
variance analysis.
Control environment. The control environment encompasses business actions,
policies , managerial philosophies, and
operating styles; it also creates an atmosphere within which internal controls
exist. This atmosph ere can enhance or
hinder the effectiveness of rcs that have
been developed for the organization.
Implementation of a standard costing
system indicates that management recognizes the importance of having benchmarks against which to measure actual
outcomes. The level (expected, practical,
or ideal) at which standards are set reOects
the degree of commitment that management has to cost control, along with
management's tolerance for deviations.
When standards are set at the expected
level, cost control is fairly lax and most
outcomes will be within tolerance ranges.
In contrast, ideal standards reflect exceptionally tight cost control but will potentially result in large unfavorable
deviations .
Risk assessment. Companies face IDany
risks, and an effective IC structure will
support assessment, analysis, and management of these risks. Neither a standard cost system nor variance analysis
can help a firm predict future risks, but
the standard setting process can force
an examination of future market and
labor conditions that may provide important information for the risk assessment
process. Standard cost systems can also
he lp in identifying the realization of
some types of risk by highl ighting when
standards have not been met.
Control activities. Control activities
are reflected in the policies and proce-
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dures used bya firm to ensure that management's wishes are accomplished. In general, a standard costing system's primary
objective is cost control. As such, standard costing control activities include
supervisory approvals or authorizations
for purchases, materials issuances, labor
rates, and contract commitments for
fixed overhead costs. Consideration
should be given to factors such as material quality, normal material-ordering
quantities, expected employee wage rates,
mix of employee skills, facility layout, and
expected degree of plant automation.
The entire variance analysis process is
a control activity that supports operationa l and compliance objectives.
Information and communication. The
control activities are facilitated by information and communicat ion within an
organization. The sharing of information helps when conducting and managing business operations, and it
enhances the effectiveness of control
activities. In the case of standard costs,
information is communicated to appropriate parties throughout the organizational hierarchy so that all will know
the basis on which performance evaluations will be made. Further, including
various organizational areas (such as
cost accounting, industrial engineering, human resources, and purchasing)
when standards are developed helps to
ensure their credibility. However, even
with the most knowledgeable input,
there will likely be variances between the
standard and actual prices and quantities during any period. The materiality
and assessme n t (favorable or unfavorable) of those variallCes will, as mentioned
earlier, be linked to the level at which
the standards are set.
Monitoring. Monitoring is an essential part of the IC framework and
ensures that the control activities
have been i nstituted, are functioning properly, and are up to date. In a
standard cost system, monitoring
occurs through the comparisons of
actual and standard information made
to ascertain operational effectiveness
and efficiency. In addition, monitoring should be viewed as an ongoing process, and, relative to standards,
STAN DARD COST VARIANCES
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EXHIBIT 1 Summary of Variances as Fraud Indicators
Va.r iance Name

Formula

Material Price
Variance (MPV)

(Actual Price - Budgeted Price)
x

Red FlaCl Indicator of Fraud
Unfavorable Variance
• Vendor kickbacks
o Change to vendor with higher prices
o Purchase of higher than
specified material grade

Actual Quantity

Favorable Variance
• Vendor kickbacks
o Larger than normal reorder
quantities
o Lower than specified material grade

Material Usage
Variance (MUV)

(Actual Quantity - Budgeted
Quantity Allowed for Actual Output)
x
Budgeted Price

Labor Rate
Variance (LRV)

(Actual Rate - Budgeted Rate)
x
Actual Hours

Labor Efficiency
Variance (LEV)

(Actual Hours - Budgeted Quantity
Allowed for Actual Output)
x
Budgeted Price

Variable Overhead
(VOH) Spending
Variance

Unfavorable Variance
• Inventory Theft
• Lower grade material was
received than was ordered
Unfavorable Variance
• "Out of the norm" labor rates for
certain employees (real or ghost)

(Actual Variable Overhead per unit Budgeted Variable Overhead per unit)
x
Actual Quantity of cost allocation base

Unfavorable Variance
• Employees overstating or "padding"
hours worked
• Presence of ghost employee
Unfavorable Variance
• Theft of supplies
• Fraudulent overtime
Favorable Variance

• VOH expenses inappropriately
capitalized in non-inventory accounts
Fixed Overhead
(FOH) Spending
Variance

Actual Costs - Budgeted Costs

Unfavorable Variance
• Ghost supervisory employee
• Inflated payments made to related
party (conflict of interest scheme)
or to gain kickback
Favorable Variance

• Asset salvage value increased and
depreciation reduced
• Asset life extended beyond the norm
and depreciation reduced
• FOH expenditures inappropriately
capitalized
Note: Standard prices, rates, quantities, or times may be inflated to game the system, leading to favorable variances.
'-..

i t is reflected in the r eview and updating of standards to reflect changes in
costs, quantities, and facilities .
The standard costing and variance
analysis system is an Ie too l that can

help ensure operationa l efficacy and promote communicat ion of expectatio n s.
In addition t o these benefits, t h e system
can be used to help management "identify areas of particular susceptibility [to
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Another possibility that would create an
unfavorable MPV is the purchase of a
higher-grade material than that designated in the bill of materials. Although the
Variances as fraud symptoms
primary cause (different grade material)
In the process of evaluating who or what might be identifiable, there is still a queswas respons ible for each variance, man- tion as to the fundamental reason for such
agers should be aware that variances a purchase. Such purchases may be made
(either unfavorable or favorable) can because the designated grade of material
reflect both legitimate and illegitimate may be unavailable. However, such purcausal circumstances . Unfavorable vari- chases may also be made because of ven ances occur when operations are less than dor kickbacks being made for purchasing
the budgeted standards: Prices are higher the higher-grade material.
or performance is lower than the standard.
Large purchase orders, coupled with
These variances cause operating income a significant unfavorable material usage
to decrease. Favorable variances reflect ' (quantity) variance (MUV), could indioperations that are better than budgeted; cate inventory theft via collusion between
as a result, operating income is increased . the purchasing and receiving or delivery
Both unfavorable and favorable variances departments; materials delivery may be
for material, labor, and overhead may be made to an unauthorized location for
red flag indicators of fraudulent activi- the benefit of the purchasing agent or
ties (as presented in Exhibit 1) . The fol- another employee . Unfavorable MUVs
lowing discussion focuses on recognizing may also arise without regard to matethe possibility that significant or ongo- rial price variances. Such variances could
ing standard cost variances could be result from inventory theft or from a
symptomatic of organizational fraud.
vendor shipping a lower-grade material
than ordered and continuing to charge
the standard material price.
Unfavorable variances
Labo r. Labor rate standards should
as indicators of fraud
reflect employee wages and related
Ma t er i al . Because alternative material
employer costs for fringe benefits, FICA
input s can generally be used to generate (Social Securit y), and unemployment
similar output and output quality, the taxes. In the simplest situation, all departinput choices that are made affect the mental personnel are paid the same wage
price and quantity standards that are set. rate as, for example, when wages are task
The choices result in trade-offs for mate- specific or tied to a l abor contract. If
rial mix and yield, finished product qual- emp loyees performing the same or simity, overall product cost, and product ilar tasks are paid different wage rates,
salabilit y. The most common factor to a weighted average rate (total wage cost
explain a material price variance (MPV) per hour divided by th e number of workis simply an increase or a decrease in unit ers) must be computed and used as the
cost; such a price change sh ould be ver- standard . Rate differences co uld be caused
ifiable by investigating comparative mar- by length of employment or skill level.
ket prices around the economic
The labor ra te variance (LRV) is the
environment in which the purchases are difference between the actua l wages paid
to labor for the pe ri od a n d the standard
being made .
Manufac t urers need to be alert to the cost of ac t ual hours worked. Changing
possibility of vendor kickbacks to purchasing a payroll rate would genera ll y require
agents and operations personnel when collusion between the hourly employee
monitoring material p r ices and usage. A and someone in the payroll area. In large
higher than expected price can result from organizations, this circumstance woul d
payments to influence the vendor selec- be unlike ly due to the ability of large
tion and/or the ordering process; a pos- firms to segregate duties among many
sible red flag indicator will be higher employees and to protect sensitive data
prices in conjunction with a vendor change. files from unaut horized access; h owe ver,
fraud] among employees in production,
operations and administration."7

MANAGERS
SHOULD BE

AWARE THAT
VARIANCES
(EITHER
UNFAVORABLE OR
FAVORABLE) CAN
REFLECT BOTH
LEGITIMATE AND
ILLiEGITIMATE
CAUSAL
CIRCUMSTANCES.
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it could occur in smaller organizations .
In attempting to find fraud related to
LRVs, an analysis shou l d be run that
highlights all "out of the norm" labor
rates - which might be quite noticeable
if union contracts are in effect. Trend
analysis would indicate whether employees with higher rates are under the supervision of the same manager.
In contrast, the labor efficiency variance (LEV) indicates whether the amount
of time worked was less or more than the
standard quantity allowed for the actual
output. Several potential fraudulent scenarios exist relative to unfavorable LEV s.
Employees may be overstating or "padding"
the number of hours worked. While there
is a wide range of ways for employees to
record their hours, there are two likely possibilities: Either the employee simply falsifies his/her timesheet and the supervisor
is unaware of the discrepancy, or there is
collusion with a supervisor to approve
additional time.
An unfavorable LEV may also indicate the possibility of one or more ghost
employees on the payroll. Ghost employees receive paychecks but provide no
productivity; thus, labor efficiency would
be below that which was expected. The
perpetrator of a ghost employee scheme
is likely to be either a supervisor who has
not communicated an employee's departure or dismissal to the payroll department or a payroll employee who has not
deleted a former employee from the system (or has simply"created" a ghost and
placed him/her on the payroll) . If the
ghost is a former employee, the perpetrator is likely in collusion with that
individual- unless the perpetrator has
the ability to obtain and cash/deposit
the ghost's paycheck .
Var i ab l e ov erh ead . Variable overhead
(VOH) covers a range of cost elements
and fluctuates in a direct relationship
with some designated level of activity
(such as direct labor or machine hours) .
It is impossible to investigate for fraud
using the total VOH spending or efficiency variance; variances in each cost
element must be analyzed separately.
VOH spending variances are caused by
both component price and volume differences. VOH spending variances are

often associated with price differences
that have not been properly included in
the standard rate; however, potential
fraud causes of indirect material and
indirect labor variances may also exist
(and reflect scenarios similar to those of
direct material and direct labor). Waste
or shrinkage of production inputs (such
as indirect material) is included in the
VOH spending variance; such a category
might be a prime location to hide supplies theft. In addition, an indirect labor
variance that could be attributed to fraud
is overtime - ei ther relative to rates or
hours - which may reflect collusion
between an employee and payroll personnel
or a supervisor; such a circumstance
might be highlighted by running an
exception report for employees who have
received an excessive amount of overtime
in a given period. Many of the other VOH
cost categories reflect prices charged by
external parties and, as such, would have
limited potential for fraud.
The VOH efficiency variance quantifies the effect of using more or less of the
activity or resource that is the base for
VOH application. Thus, if VOH is applied
on a direct labor hour basis, the VOH
efficiency variance will track in tandem
with a labor efficiency variance and is the
result of the causal direct labor factors.
Fi xed ov e rh e ad. As with variable overhead, fixed overhead (FOH) is comprised
of numerous cost elements including production and supervisory salaries, straightline depreciation on factory assets, factory
insurance, and the fixed portion of mixed
factory costs (such as utilities and Ipaintenance). The FOH spending variance
represents the differences between budgeted and actual costs for the numerous
FOH components, although it can also
reflect resource mismanagement. As with
VOH variances, individual spending variances should be calculated for each FOH
component. An unfavorable spending
variance fo~ salaries could reflect ghost
supervisory employees on the payroll.
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AN
UNFAVORABLE
SPENDING
VARIANCE FOR
SALARIES
COULD REFLECT
GHOST
SUPERVI SORY
EMPLOYEES ON
THE PAYROLL.

Favorable variances
as indicators of fraud
Favorable variances, because they increase
income, are sometimes not investigated
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as carefully as unfavorable variances Combating fraud: A combination of
because manufacturers are more concerned low-tech and high-tech approaches
with eliminating process inefficiencies; Companies should employ a variety of
however, some favorable variances may high-tech and low-tech methods to comsignal fraud. For example, a favorable bat fraud. "Tried and true" methods to
MPV may arise if materials are being pur- prevent and detect material-related fraud
chased in larger-than-normal reorder include implementation of policies about
quantities as a result of a vendor kick- vendor diversification, partnership
back scheme. A favorable MPV would alliances, and primary/sole sourcing
also be the result of buying a lower- relationships. Trends relative to purthan-specified grade of material. This chases from a particular supplier should
situation might occur because of a lack be analyzed, especially in conjunction with
in availability of the designated grade, ongoing orders from a particular purbut kickbacks could also be a factor. In chasing agent. The materials market
this circumstance, it is useful to review should be monitored periodically to
the MPV in conjunction with the MUV.
ascertain that prices being paid are comCommonly, using lower-grade materipetitive . Lastly, if material quantity varials results in an unfavorable MUV and
ances are becoming more noticeable, the
possibly an unfavorable LEV due to the
material flow from the vendor to the
necessity for rework. Capitalizing varishop floor may need to be traced by using
able or fixed overhead expenses in nonphysical flow information, bar coding,
inventory accounts would reduce actual
or RFID tags to determine if "bad" out overhead cost and create favorable VOH
put is related to poor quality material
or FOH spending variance. Maintenance
input from a particular vendor.
costs have often been capitalized in fraud
The most effective deterrent to other
situations, such as Rent- Way Inc. 8 A sigtypes
of fraud requires minimizing the
nificant decline in the depreciation
opportunity
to manipulate wage rates, stanexpense during a period should be invesdards,
and
overhead.
Reports should be
tigated to determine if asset salvage valgenerated
that
highlight
period-to-period
ues have been increased, or if asset lives
wage
adjustments,
especially
those made
have been extended beyond the norm;
outside
of
the
normal
raise
timeframes
such techniques were heavily used in the
(such as quarterly or annually). Such
waste management fraud case. 9
reports
can also indicate employees whose
Today's emphasis on performancehours
worked
are considered "excessive"
based compensation can create a powerful incentive for managers to inflate as defined by the organization in rela standard prices/rates or quantities/times tionship to a normal workweek, although
- either throug h gaining access to data this would possibly adjusted for seasonal
files or by influencing the standard set- variations or rush jobs. Standards files
ting process so as to "game the system." should be password protected, and access
Inflated standards can make actual per- should be limited to employees with the
formance appear more positive. Inap- authority to change standards. For both
propriate influence could arise, for labor rate and time standards changes,
example, by including an excessively the employee's supervisor should be
high waste factor in the material quan- alerted to note any variance patterns and
tity standards or downtimelrework fac- ascertain the sources of those variations.
tor in the labor time standard while Procedures to assess the possibility of ghost
knowing that such m isuse or delay is employees are well established and
unlike ly to occur. Additionally, if over- include the following:
independent corroboration between
head standards are inflated, year-end
human resource and payroll
results will generate an overapplied overdepartments of current employees;
head balance that, when written off as a
review of payroll records for
negative adjustment to cost of goods
sold, can suddenly make income meet
employees lacking Social Security
or exceed expected targets.
numbers;
COST MANAGEMENT
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EXHIBIT 2 Data Mining for Fraud (Assumes Ongoing Variances)
Variance(s)

Data Mined

Uncovers

Type of Fraud

Unfavorable material
variance and
favorable material
usage variance

Accounts payable and
material requisitions

Purchases made
from same vendor

Kickbacks being
paid to purchasing agent

Unfavorable or
favorable material
price variance

Accounts payable and
employee records

Purchases made from
same vendor; vendor
has same address as
purchasing agent

Shell company
established by
purchasing agent

Unfavorable or
favorable material
price variance

Accounts payable and
employee records

Unnaturally
consecutive invoice
numbers

Shell company
established by
purchasing agent

Unfavorable material
usage variance

Material requisitions,
receiving reports,
and employee records

Material requisitioned
was delivered to
alternate address

Employee theft
of materials

Unfavorable labor
rate variance

Personnel records and
wages payable

Same supervisor for
all overpaid employees

Collusion between
supervisor and overpaid
employees

Unfavorable labor
efficiancy variance

Personnel records and
employee timesheets

No timesheets for
certain employees

Ghost employee

Unfavorable labor
efficiancy variance

Employee timesheets
and supervisor records

Falsified employee
timesheets all
all ocourred under
same supervisor

Collusion between
supervisor and
"absent" employees

Unfavorable variable
overhead spending
variance - indirect
labor

Employee times heels
and overtime rates

Excessive overtime
or excessive
overtime rates paid
to employees

Collusion between
employee and payroll
personnel or manager

Unfavorable fixed
overhead spending
variance - salaries

Personnel records and
employee timesheets

A supervisor does not
exist or is no longer
with the company

Ghost supervisory
employee

Unfavorable fixed
overhead spending
variance - ---~
depreciation

Asset aquisition
records and
depreciation
calculations

Asset salvage value
reduced or asset life
extended beyong
the norm

Management
influencing
performance-based
compensation

-----

common deductions (such as insurance premiums or union dues);
basic data (such as home address ,
phone number, or email);
direct deposit information
(although, depending on the organization and type of employees, lack
of this information may be common); and
cross-referencing duplicate
employee information .
STANDARD COST VARIANCES

Variance analysis is helpful in drawing
attention to certain types of fraud, but it
can be somewhat limited in the information proyided. To supplement the information gleaned through variance analysis,
manufacturers should also leverage loday's
powerful and flexible technologies to
detect fraudulent activities.
Data mining. Data mining is one example of a technology that can complement
variance analysis in detecting fraud. Data
MAY/JUNE 2013
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EXHIBIT 3 Visual Ana lytics of Purchase Order Numbers
-~-------------~~--
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nllnlllg explores, aggregates, and analyzes large amounts of organizational
data so as to "better understand business processes, trends, and opportunities [and] improve efficiency and
effectiveness, as well as to discover anomalies." 10 Data mining is commonly used
to discover significant patterns (especially those that might have been previously obscured) in the mined information
- often to predict future behavior. l l
Therefore, after variance analysis highlights differences between actual and
standard prices and quantities, data mining can be used to filter and sort individual transactions to identify similarities
within the information (or to detect outliers that could be used to detect the
possibility of fraudulent transactions).
The data mining software is able to check
relationships among multiple variables
in multiple fields, so as to indicate implausible or surprising cases."
For example, a data mining"drill down"
may ascertain that a large portion of
transactions causing a material price or
usage variance share a common characteristic: All of them resulted from materials purchased from a single vendor.
24
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Additional comparative analysis might
reveal that the vendor shares certain identifying information (e.g., phone number,
fax, email, or address) with that of an
employee - presenting a possibility of
a pass-through or shell company. A shell
company may also be a possibility if data
mining shows that a vendor's invoice
numbers are more consecutive than would
naturally occur in a legitimate business .
Another example of the use of data mining relates to a labor efficiency variance;
data extraction may indicate that all labor
inefficiencies occurred during a particular shift or under a particular shift supervisor. Additional scrutiny of the data logs
might show a system override by the
supervisor that allowed several "employees" to be added to the payroll records or
inconsistencies and inaccuracies in personnel information. Exhibit 2 provides
some examples of issues that might be
uncovered after mining different types
of information and the frauds that might
be related to those discoveries .
Visual analytics. Visual an alytics (VA)
is another tool that can complement variance analysis in detecting fraud. VA uses
a computer to create a representation of
STANDARD COST VARIANCES
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complex data that is then subjected to
human visual analysis - taking advantage of a human's ability to visually identify trends or patterns with which
computers often struggle . This phenomenon is illustrated by the use of
CAPTCHA technology to distinguish a
human from a computer. CAPTCHA
stands for Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and
Humans Apart. It is typically implemented by warping the text, distorting
the background, and adding lines, all in
order to to make it difficult for automated routines to identify the text .
Thus, VA combines automated analysis processes with interactive visualizations to "enable detection of the expected
and discovery of the unexpected within
massive, dynamically changing information spaces," says Kris Cook, director
of the National Visualization and Analytics Center. 13 Similar to data mining,
VA can be used to identify connections
and/or trends within the data that may
be difficult to discover using traditional
techniques. For example, as illustrated
in Exhibit 3, VA may be used to generate an analysis of purchase orders for
multiple vendors over several years. The

chart highlights purchase orders from
the same vendor by connecting them
with a line, which can then be inspected
for unexpected trends. Purchase order
numbers that occur out of sequence or
are repeated are easily identified and
may indicate a fraudulent purchase order.
With an online interactive chart, further investigation can take place by clicking on the purchase order to retrieve the
details of that transaction.
Another example of visual analytics
is a network diagram of vendors and
addresses, such as the one shown in
Exhibit 4. In this example, the approved
vendor list has three vendors at the same
address with similar names and different vendor IDs. While the most likely
cause of this situation is that vendors
were entered without thoroughly checking to see if the vendor information was
already in the system, there is the potential for the duplicate vendors to be used
in a kickback scheme, shell company, or
other type of fraud. Invoices from (and
payments made to) the duplicate vendors should be investigated.
Link analysis is another VA tool that
allows relationships, especially those
that are hidden in complex networks, to
be seen in a "web" diagram. Exhibit 5
provides a link analysis among purchase
orders, vendors, and standard cost variances. This diagram indicates that management may want to investigate why the
purchasing agent is primarily buying
materials from a vendor that, although
selling at below market prices and generating favorable material price variances, provides inputs that appear to be
of inappropriate quality due to the generation of unfavorable material quantity variances.
Today's enterprise systems integrate
all functional areas of an organization to
capture all aspects of transactions - with
the data centrally located in one database rather than in disparate systems.
The ability provided by data mining to easily "drill down" into transactional details
helps mitigate risk by allowing the examination of an entire data population and
the relationships between and among the
data (rather than simply reviewing a limited data sample).14 Additionally, the capa-
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EXHIBIT 4 Network Diagram of
Vendors
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EXHIBIT 5 Link Analysis of Vendors and Variances

Unfavorable
MPVs
5 from Vendor A
30 from Vendor B
10 from Vendor C
90 from Vendor 0

.
~

No MPVs
45 from Vendor A
50 from Vendor B
10 from Vendor C

Favorable
MPVs
180 from Vendor C
310 from Vendor 0

Favorable
MUVs'
38 from Vendor A
94 from Vendor B
15 from Vendor C

~~;'

;

.

r.

---

No MUVs'
19 from Vendor A
94 from Vendor B
20 from Vendor C

Unfavorable
MPVs'
135 from Vendor C
158 from Vendor 0

• All material is not issued in the same quantities or the same period as POS.

bility of visual analytics to expose data's
"latent knowledge" without any hypothe ses about variance causality also provides
managers with a valuab le too1. 15 Managers no longer have to rely solely on
judgment to ascertain the meaning behind
a variance computation; data patterns
and relationships can be highlighted with
data mining and VA techniques.

Conclusion
A manufacturer (or any othe r organization) that does not act on situations
exposed by detective controls (such a.s
variances) risks l osing a substantial
amount of money.16 Early identification
of fraud is particularly important because
once the fraudulent actions have
"infected" the accounting system , recognition of the problems becomes exceedingly more difficult. For example, if
standards are inflated in the current
per iod, those standards will like ly serve
as the basis for analysis until management orders a standard costing system
review. Cost or rate increases may simply be "a d ded on" to the fictit iously
inflated standard - generating larger
favorable variances and the potential for
even greater bonuses. If ghost employ26
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ees have been placed on the payroll,
those "employees" will likely remain and
continue receiving checks until a detailed
human resource review is performed.
Ignoring standard cost variances or
accepting superficial exp lanations for
those var ian ces dramatically minimizes
the functionality of the detective internal control p rovide d by variance analy sis. Data mining and graphical techniques
(such as visual analytics) can he lp explain
standard cost variances, and t hey can
enhance a manager's ab il ity to identify
problem areas and fraud. Technology
augments human ingenuity by provid ing
users with greater context and depth of
information. 17 Not leveraging the tools
availab le to investigate and recognize
potential fraudulent causes of standard
costing variances strengthens the opportunity to commit fraud.
Variances are often overlooked as fraud
indicators. One reason that managers
may not act on suspicious variances is
that in analyzing standard cost variances, management commonly tends to
accept the "easiest" or first explanation
provided. In doing so, management i.s
acting in conformity with a version of a
14th century line of reasoning referred
to as Occam's razor (principle) or the
STANDARD COST VARIANCES

rule of simplicity. In its most minimalist form, this principle indicates that,
while many possible explanations may exist
for an outcome, the simplest reason is often
the correct one.'8 However, such a "minimalist" version is not a complete one:
Occam's razor actually continues further to state that additional circumstances should be examined to ascertain
whether they provide more compelling
arguments . Therefore, management mus t
use all techniques at its disposal to delve
into what might be underlying fraudulent causes for variances. Although definitely not the cause of all standard cost
variances, fraud cannot be ruled out
unle ss managers seek to discover the real
causes rather than relying on Occam's
razor's easy explanations . •
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